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Abstract: This article looks at the deployment of partnership-as-governance in the area of EU and
Irish waste management and incineration policy. Looking at the specific case of plans to locate a
municipal incinerator at Poolbeg in Dublin, the key argument offered is that institutional
arrangements in this instance fail to address fundamental issues of power inequalities. As a
result, concertation actually increases levels of citizen’s dissatisfaction and hostility, making
community-based resistance against incineration all the more likely.
I INTRODUCTION
In recent times, waste management has become one of Ireland’s most heatedpolitical topics. Conflict, protest and resistance by communities over the
introduction of the “bin tax”, municipal incineration and so-called “super-
dumps”, coupled with the threat of legal action from the European
Commission, have all conspired to give the Irish government a major political
headache. But the issue of waste management is of interest for other reasons.
It serves as an instructive case study on how partnership-as-governance – or
more specifically, “social dialogue” – is configured in a multi-level or
transnational context. 
This paper looks at how partnership arrangements are deployed on Irish
waste management policy, drawing on research from Dublin City Council
(DCC) proposals to build a municipal incinerator at Dublin’s Poolbeg
Peninsula. The key argument made is that current practices – along with
1
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inherent institutional weaknesses – are more likely to augment opposition to
government policy than enhance consensus amongst interested parties. These
deficiencies exacerbate inequalities in power relations by neglecting to provide
institutional space or “thickness” that adequately deals with such
fundamental issues of governance.
I begin by briefly outlining the background to the case of the Poolbeg
incinerator and the methodology employed in the study. Next, I show that the
deployment of partnership and “social dialogue” are important features of
European Union (EU) – and Irish – waste policy. Despite the popularity of
such arrangements, it is argued here that partnership fails to address some of
the key issues of governance in relation to municipal incineration policy.
Deficiencies in this respect include an inability to successfully manage conflict
and the lack of institutional decision-making capacity between partners. In
other words, more deliberative modes of governance such as partnership
cannot account for inherent power inequalities.
Therefore, it is the issue of power and how it is exercised, that proves to be
the undoing of partnership in this particular case. More often than not,
incineration is seen by many in the first instance as an “environmental issue”,
where, for instance, political power, class and justice are seen as secondary in
importance. Below, I argue the contrary, where issues of power – whether
political or economic, contribute significantly to the shape of policy outcomes. 
Against this background, concertation processes deployed in relation to
the Poolbeg incinerator are examined. Partnership in this instance has been
manifestly unsuccessful in that, rather than producing a consensus between
government and the affected communities, the process has actually
heightened dissatisfaction and suspicion amongst citizens, making a
community-based protest against incinerator plans all the more likely. I make
this argument by examining three issues of power – inequality between social
partners in terms of being able to affect policy outcomes; the issue of
participation in final decision-making, where a stark differentiation must be
made between participation in the governance process and direct involvement
in decision-making; and finally, the problematic of the legitimacy of
representation through the stakeholder system in the broader, public context. 
BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY – THE EU, WASTE POLICY AND
THE PROPOSED POOLBEG INCINERATOR
The European Commission has consistently identified the environment as
a key policy area and this has been reflected in the EU’s legislative programme
(European Commission, 2001). Subsequently, the environment was the fastest
2 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
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growing area of legislation in the 1980s. (Taylor, 2001; p. 22). The Commission
has sought to regulate the management of different waste streams through
legislation. The 1975 “Waste” Directive1 encompassed much of what is
included in Ireland’s primary piece of waste management legislation, the 1996
“Waste Management Act”.2
Meeting targets on the diversion of waste from landfill is a key part of EU
– and Irish – legislation. Failure to achieve agreed targets can result in the
imposition of legal and financial sanctions against offending member states.
In response to its legal obligations, the Irish government an integrated
approach to waste management, allowing a number of different options to be
employed simultaneously, for instance, landfilling, recycling and incineration,
in order to reduce waste levels. In 1997, a report by consultants the MCCK
Group entitled “The Dublin Waste Management Strategy Study”, recom-
mended the building of a municipal incinerator for Dublin “… to burn most of
the city’s commercial and domestic refuse” (The Irish Times, 23rd December,
1999). In 1999, as part of the Dublin regional waste management strategy,
four potential sites were selected as a possible location for an incineration
plant. Out of those four sites, Poolbeg was identified as the preferred site.3
When Dublin’s integrated waste management strategy was announced, it was
expected that the incinerator plan would take anything from three to six years
to implement (Irish Independent, 3rd February, 2001). Dublin City Manager,
John Fitzgerald stated in January 2001 that incineration could not be “foisted
on people without taking account of legitimate fears” (The Irish Times,
January 8th, 2001). The preferred means of addressing these “legitimate
fears” came in the guise of the Community Interest Group (CIG). The idea
here was that members of the affected communities, Ringsend, Sandymount
and Irishtown were given an opportunity to query various experts and
interested parties about concerns over the incinerator. Almost immediately,
however, both CIG members and other members of the communities saw the
process as little more than a protracted public relations exercise on the part of
Dublin City Council (DCC). 
Some of the policy measures adopted by the government were always
going to prove contentious with the public. In the policy statement Changing
Our Ways, the then Environment Minister pointed out that in the Irish
context, new waste initiatives have usually been greeted with “vigorous local
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1 Council Directive (75/442/EEC).
2 The Act includes provisions for waste prevention, recycling, energy recovery, the establishment
of what would become the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as well as the “Polluter
Pays” Principle.
3 The other three sites were Robinhood and Newlands in South Co. Dublin and Cherrywood in
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown.
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opposition”. (1998, p. 19). This assertion proved to be utterly prophetic.
Community opposition was concentrated around the issues of the siting of
regional “super-dumps”, the proposed sites for incinerators, as well as
increasing community opposition to waste charges, particularly in the Dublin
region. Resistance to the government’s waste strategy delayed its
implementation and resulted in the government facing legal sanctions from
the EU. 
In response to legal threats from Europe in 2001, the government adopted
the 2001 Amendment to the Waste Management Act (1996). In certainly the
most controversial political move made by the government on waste policy, all
decision-making powers on waste policy were removed from locally elected
representatives (previously one of the few “reserved functions” of councillors),
and was given to county or city managers – who are unelected officials. This
paved the way for all of Ireland’s regional waste strategies to be adopted,
including, crucially, provisions for the building of incinerators. At the time, the
Environment Minister, Martin Cullen, stated quite unambiguously that the
planning process on waste management was “over-democratised” and that he
did not believe it was “… adding anything to it by having so many layers
involved”. (The Irish Times, 12th September, 2002).4
Opposition to incineration and super-dumps continue countrywide. DCC
spent much of 2004 submitting an Environmental Impact Statement for
approval to the planning authority, submitting a licence application to the
Environmental Protection Agency, as well as submitting an application to the
Commission for Energy Regulation.5 They have also conducted a number of
“information sessions” with the public on various aspects of incineration. For
their part, residents from Ringsend, Irishtown and Sandymount remain
implacably opposed to the incinerator and have indicated that they will launch
a rigorous campaign of opposition when the statutory process is enacted.6
4 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
4 The role of city and county managers was strengthened again with adoption of “Protecting the
Environment Act” (2003) where “local authorities are being given explicit power to discontinue the
collection of domestic waste in the event of non-payment of charges” (Department of the
Environment, press release).
5 See http://www.dublinwastetoenergy.ie/
6 One interesting development is a recent statement by DCC. In the statement they linked
increases in domestic waste charges with the incinerator issue, claiming that waste charges will
continue to increase until the incinerator is operational. Any opposition or delays to the
incinerator will ensure more increases in charges in the future. See www.rte.ie/news/2005/
0418/waste.htm – accessed 20th April, 2005.
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III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research and data presented here is the result of a three-year case
study, conducted between 2000 and 2003. The primary purpose of the research
was to look at the impact of transnational forces on Irish political power
relationships. The issue of the introduction of incineration into Ireland
allowed for an analysis of the degree to which multi-level governance,
transnational NGOs, and transnational “expert” discourse networks can
impact at the local or community level. 
A qualitative approach was adopted for the study. The principal reason for
this is that the study deals with a number of concepts whose meaning are
fundamentally contested. This can be seen in relation to the different
understandings assigned to terms such as “participation” or “consultation” by
key actors, and at different levels of governance. As a result, it is important,
and I hope valuable, to examine how different actors perceive these issues in
relation to governance processes surrounding incineration. This is especially
relevant when attempting to ascertain how various transnational processes
might impact at the local or community level and how people within
communities themselves might perceive these processes.
The study adopted the use of “purposive sampling”, in other words, the
deliberate selection of sampling that would yield the maximum amount of data
relevant to the research question. This of course is a key rationale for choosing
the case study format. Identification of the relevant sample of participants for
this study came about primarily through conducting previous research on
waste management in Ireland. In addition, a “triangulation” strategy of
gathering data was adopted. Three principle methods were utilised –
interviewing, participant observation, and documentary analysis, with
interviewing being the primary source of data collection. This method of
“multiple data collection” (Merriam, 2002, p. 25) allows the researcher to make
a more informed interpretation of the data by checking the validity of one
method with the findings from another method. 
The research presented here includes extracts from a number of
confidential interviews (given the politically sensitive nature of the subject)
with residents from Ringsend – a residential area located in close proximity to
the proposed site of the Poolbeg incinerator, elected representatives
(Councillors, TDs and MEPS), officials (Dublin City Council, Government
Departments and the European Commission) and representatives from a
transnational NGO.
WASTE MANAGEMENT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCINERATION 5
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Social Partnership, Dialogue and Governance: Waste Policy from Brussels to
Ringsend
With a diversity of competing origins invested in the term “social
partnership”, comes, inevitably, a myriad of contested “meanings”. Depending
on your point of view, “social partnership” is mere Corporatism dressed up in
21st Century terminology, the successful co-option of social and political
opposition to the political/economic elite, or a clear signal of the emergence of
political discourse that is firmly rooted in consensus building and deliberation.
In this latter context, partnership-as-governance offers a proscription for some
of the deficiencies residing within representative democracy – the so-called
“democratic deficit”. Partnership offers the possibility “…to democratise and
decentralise public life, as well as facilitate the renewal of the representative
system by reconsidering the principles of delegation” (Rui, 2004, p. 131).7
Whether or not such a “renewal” is possible through simple institutional re-
arrangements in relation to delegation is, of course, a highly contentious point. 
One important “meaning” associated with Irish partnership incorporates
the concept of “Social Dialogue”, which amounts to “…a structured exchange
of views and formal opportunities for consultation rather than co-operation in
policy making.” (Casey and Gold, 2000, p. 9).8 In a study of 9 EU states, the
authors found Ireland, and particularly the Partnership 2000 agreement as
constituting “the most comprehensive form of ‘augmented’ social dialogue…”
(Ibid, p. 122). This “co-operation in policy-making” approach can be seen in the
inclusion of the Community and Voluntary sector in national partnership
negotiations from 1997. (Hardiman, 2002, pp. 11-12). A broadening of the
policy remit to include social policy and the establishment of the NESF
(National Economic and Social Forum) are further indications of this
approach, while the government has clearly stated in recent times:
The State does not have a monopoly on wisdom or expertise in all areas of
economic and social life. Problems can best be solved with the active
involvement of the relevant stakeholders. The Government is committed
to a social partnership approach across the policy spectrum. (Department
of the Taoiseach, 2004, p. 26)
6 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
7 “Partnership” in the Irish context also contains elements of what Casey and Gold refer to as the
“new institutional economics” approach (2000, p. 3), as well as Catholic social teaching of the
1930s that emphasised “…the mutual dependence of labour and capital…” (Casey and Gold, 2000,
p. 12). 
8 In much broader terms, the concept of partnership-as-governance has been viewed favourably by
the Irish State. One particular innovation identified by the OECD was the development of “local
partnerships” as a means of decentralising economic governance. The Boards of these
partnerships comprised of national social partner organisations and local community interests.
(OECD, 1996, p. 9) 
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According to Casey and Gold, the “European Social Model” is “clearly
predicated upon the maintenance of social partnership and social protection”
(2000, p. 2), where the concept of social partnership is seen as an effective
mode of governance in many areas of EU social policy. The European
Commission, by its own admission, acknowledges that EU political legitimacy
cannot rely on representative democratic structures alone. (Commission of the
European Communities, 2001) Therefore, key policy-making mechanisms
involve consultation with recognised stakeholders from industry and civil
society through more than 600 formal and informal structures and processes.9
EU waste management policy-making incorporates these mechanisms in a
multi-level manner, where the communities to be most affected by policy
decisions are given recognition as stakeholders. For example, in the 2000
“Incinerator Directive”, the EU stated that public consultation must be
conducted prior to the building of such installations. Likewise, in a key Irish
government policy document on waste management, Changing Our Ways, the
government announced a “new approach to waste management planning” that
involved “constructive cooperation with local communities and neighbouring
local authorities…” (1998, p. 7). Its current “Race against Waste” campaign
has developed a National Advisory Group and 3 Regional Waste Networks,
involving stakeholders from sectors such as farming, business, the trades
unions, NGOs, local authorities, the government and the community.
At the local level, initiatives such as the CIG in Ringsend have sought to
include the views of citizens and communities in the implementation of policy
on the proposed Poolbeg incinerator. At the inception of the CIG, Matt
Twomey, Acting Assistant City Manager stated that:
Serving on the Community Interest Group in no way indicates that you
support the proposal to site a thermal treatment plant on the Poolbeg
Peninsula. It simply means that you believe that the views of the
community must be effectively represented.10
In more general terms, DCC envisage civil society as having “a meaningful
role to play” in the future governance of the city:
The implementation of a more collaborative form of local governance
requiring institutional thickness due to the involvement of a larger number
WASTE MANAGEMENT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCINERATION 7
9 The EU is required by the EC Treaty to consult with both employers and trade unions in
preparing policy proposals while the Maastricht Treaty included a formal declaration on the
importance of enhancing the relationship between Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
the Commission. (Casey and Gold, 2000: p. 123).
10 Dublin Corporation press release, 14th June, 2001
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of actors – viewed as stakeholders – representing the socially and culturally
diverse population, working collectively with elected representatives and
representatives from all sectors of social partnership.11
IV PARTNERSHIP AS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Social partnership shares many characteristics found in the broad
conceptual framework of “deliberative democracy” (Smith, 2003, p. 85), where
the importance of “rational discourse” – reasoned deliberation by participants
within processes with the purpose of shaping public policy – is crucially
important.12 Through the use of rational discourse in the public sphere,
collective choices are arrived at that distinguish universal interests from
particular interests (Rui, 2004, p. 137). Simply engaging in the deliberative
process supplies the requisite legitimacy to decisions that emerge because ,
participation signifies that actors are prepared to exhibit “…internal attitudes
of mutual respect and impartiality that allow the development of imagination
and empathy.” (Smith, 2003, p. 60). Critically too, Smith points out that “[a]s
long as participants accept the conditions under which collective decisions and
judgements are reached, disagreement does not undermine deliberation.”
(ibid.)
However, a number of problems arise when we consider deliberative
democracy at a theoretical level and I would argue that this is because
theoretical – and institutional – arrangements of deliberative democracy (and
partnership) resolutely fail to consider power relations in any meaningful way.
For instance, can the same value be placed on participating in a deliberative
process as can be placed on participation in the final decision-making itself?
As we will see, this distinction is crucial. Despite the emergence in recent
times of more institutional mechanisms enabling citizens to get more directly
involved in public policy processes, “…the very moment of decision-making is
still protected.” (Rui, 2004, p. 133).13 The key issue of the “institutional design”
for decision-making:
8 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
11 See www.dublin.ie
12 Some authors (Salskov-Iverson, 2000; Fischer, 2004) see the move towards a more deliberative
democratic model as an inevitable consequence of the growing ‘complexity” of global and
transnational multi-layered, political networks
13 Switzerland is cited as the only exception where legal frameworks ensure the sharing of
decision-making. (Rui, 2004, p. 133
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…generally remains a highly abstract and theoretical endeavour – that it
fails to systematically engage in the “messy” and more detailed task of
institutional design. In particular, there has been a lack of detailed
analysis of institutions that would allow for the political engagement of
citizens in the decision-making process. (Smith, 2003, p. 79).
The deficiencies in institutional design for decision-making are seen by
some as a key weakness in the workings of Irish national partnership
arrangements. For instance, the “Community Platform”, an umbrella
organisation for Community and Voluntary groups and a recognised
stakeholder in national negotiations, eventually withdrew from talks in 2002
claiming that the government was failing to consult meaningfully with
organisations on a number of crucial policy issues.14
A second, related theoretical issue focuses on the implication that
consensus or “problem solving” will emerge from the deliberative process,
almost as a consequence of entering into the process itself. Smith certainly
alludes to this when commenting that “disagreement does not undermine
deliberation” and that deliberation allows space for “value pluralism”. (2003:
p21) As we have seen, deliberative democratic theory assumes that those who
take part in the process do so in a reasoned and rational manner, with respect
and impartiality, where a rational consensus is arrived at through
deliberation. In other words, there no are zero sum games to be considered,
there are no power configurations to be accounted for. Does this sound
plausible? As Fischer argues – “…given the pluralistic nature of modern
societies, deliberation is just as likely to produce conflict and disagreement as
it is to generate consensus” (2004, p. 23). Rui goes further, citing evidence from
an empirical study on public concertation on transport policy in France,
arguing that rather than making conflict disappear, concertation can add fuel
to the fire and act as a rallying point for “citizen mobilisation”. (2004, p. 133).
V POWER, GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
Thus far, the argument has been made that partnership-as-governance,
both theoretically and institutionally, negates any meaningful consideration of
power relationships. And yet, the asymmetries of power, in many respects,
underlines the governance and partnership arrangements in relation to the
Poolbeg incinerator. This has relevance with many environmental issues,
WASTE MANAGEMENT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCINERATION 9
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where in recent times, there has been an increased focus on social justice as a
strong, mitigating factor in any consideration of sustainable development.( e.g.
Scandrett et al 2000). The concept of environmental justice is primarily
concerned with the critical importance of class, race and inequality in framing
environmental discourses and associated governance processes. A recognition
of environmental justice is a recognition that 
…some are losing and others are winning benefits from environmental
damage, there is a need to prioritise the interests of the losers, and privilege
is seldom given up voluntarily. (Scandrett et al, 2000, p. 473).
If the ability or capacity to exercise power offsets, or alternatively,
exacerbates the effects of environmental injustice, then, according to Leroy
and Verhagen, the capacity to exercise political power, through mobilisation
and access, is central (2003, p. 164). The issue of access to political processes
is a salient feature of this case study. The removal of decision-making powers
from elected representatives by the government in 2001 effectively meant that
access to political processes for residents was reduced to participation in the
CIG. This important factor notwithstanding, the issue of whether
representation through institutionally recognised partners/stakeholders gives
members of the public adequate access to political processes needs to be
considered. The inequality in power between stakeholders and government –
epitomised in the “protection” of final decision-making, between stakeholders
themselves, and finally, between stakeholders and the public, take on added
importance in the absence of any representative democratic processes. The
nature of these asymmetrical relationships and their impact in relation to the
Poolbeg incinerator are discussed in greater detail below.
POOLBEG INCINERATOR CASE STUDY – UNEQUAL PARTNERS
The first aspect of the case study I wanted to examine concerns some of the
core assumptions made in deliberative modes of governance about its
participants, chiefly in characterising them in a simplistic, “rational pluralist”
manner. From this “ideal type” emerges a second assumption – that engaging
in the process, even when there are manifest disagreements between
protagonists, results in a rational consensus emerging through a process of
deliberation. However, this description of social partnership negates the
effects of power relations between stakeholders in such processes. Put simply,
some partners are more equal than others in their ability to influence process
outcomes.
10 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
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In the case of the Poolbeg incinerator, inequalities of this nature are
observable at different levels of governance and have, it can be argued, a
significant impact on framing policy. For instance, at EU level, concertation is
formalised within the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). The ESC
constitutes a consultative forum for stakeholders to examine Commission
legislative proposals and offer their views and opinions on policy. On waste
management policy, these stakeholders can include the private sector (both
the waste industry and industry in general) and NGOs such as Greenpeace or
Friends of the Earth. While both sectors take part in consultations on
proposed legislation, a common complaint from NGOs, however, is that the
private sector is able to influence policy outcomes far more directly and
effectively than themselves.
For instance, one representative from a transnational NGO recounted her
experience of a consultation process involving EU legislation:
…the only experience I had with policymaking process on an EU level was
with waste from national electronic products. In my opinion it would be
more open and transparent than policymaking process here in Ireland. I do
think for that Directive [waste from national electronic products] they
actively looked for participation from NGOs. They had a massive
industrial lobby against a certain element of that Directive and they looked
for NGOs to give their opinion. They went out of their way to get opinions
from NGOs. So I do think that was positive.
However, in assessing overall impact on policy outcomes, the NGO
representative went on to say:
I think the industry lobby did win out but it went through a couple of drafts
of that Directive. In its purest sense, when the first draft of that Directive
was brought out, it would have been more favourable to NGOs, but the
massive industrial lobby changed it. The industrial lobby has more time,
more resources to put into lobbying than maybe NGOs do. So that’s an
imbalance that might not necessarily be corrected by the EU consultation
process… 
Resources are a major issue here. It is not unusual for major industrial
sectors or firms to have a permanent lobby presence in Brussels. Even the
largest NGOs would have difficulty competing with that level of resources. An
Environment Commission official made the following observation:
WASTE MANAGEMENT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCINERATION 11
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There was a stakeholder meeting, where everyone was invited, including
the public. It was interesting to see at that meeting that 99 percent were
from the waste industry and/or producer industry, and there was one
representative from an NGO and that was it. But again, its not that
surprising given …public understanding of the system and how to get
information, and secondly, of course, the resources involved.
Local NGOs fare even worse in EU governance processes. First, local
NGOs are not “recognised” stakeholders according to current Commission
definitions – this has critical implications in terms of access to governance
processes. A representative of a transnational NGO offers the following
evidence of what he saw as a failure by the EU to properly consider the views
of the more locally-based NGOs:
I was at a conference in December in the UK and the furniture recycling
people found that the policy had failed in the European Union. Waste
management policy had failed to take into account the activities of
hundreds of reuse organisations…its an example again of the kinda top-
down and the lack of maybe facilitating input from grassroots groups
throughout the community…
One Irish MEP was more forthright in identifying the reason why local
groups, such as the Ringsend residents, cannot impact on decisions at EU level
– a lack of political power and a lack of accountability on the part of the
Commission:
…their views don’t really count because they’re not important. I mean, I’m
not saying they’re not important, but that’s the way it’s looked at by the
institutions. Look, I mean, if there’s a local residents group down in
Ringsend and they’re really not happy with what’s going on [in relation to
the incinerator], it doesn’t really bother the Commission because the
Commission aren’t accountable to them, they don’t have to worry about
going back and getting re-elected or whatever.
At the national level, the needs of the industrial sector – under the
auspices of the need to maintain economic competitiveness – has clearly had
an impact on the direction of waste management policy, particularly when
incineration is considered. It is here that the machinations of power
significantly frame governance processes (partnership, deliberative or
otherwise), as much as policy outcomes. Mark Boyle (2003) has argued that in
order to maintain competitiveness in the economy while at the same
12 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
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complying with EU waste regulations, the Irish government has opted for
waste management options that favour “end-of-pipe” solutions. “End-of-pipe”
solutions are those have least impact on the design and production processes
– hence minimising costs of waste to industry. In practice this means the
introduction of incineration – something that NGOs – transnationally,
nationally and locally, are totally opposed to.15
A REAL VOICE – INCLUSION IN DECISION-MAKING
One of the key arguments offered here is that social partnership processes
fail to develop an “institutional design” for decision-making. One of the
perceived benefits of the partnership mode of governance is that it gives a
“voice” to those who habitually find themselves excluded from decision-making
processes. However, concepts such as “participation”, “inclusion” or “com-
munity empowerment” need to be critically scrutinised not least in terms of
overall impact on decision-making. It is far less problematic to give a voice to
certain groups if a basic consensus exists between partners – particularly
those of unequal capacity to influence decisions. But the effectiveness of this
“voice” only becomes apparent when conflict or differences arise between
partners. 
Instead of concertation offering an opportunity for a more inclusive
decision-making process, the reality can be somewhat different. Rui argues
that concertation is less about consensus and more about offering a forum for
citizens to express their opposition to policies:
Empirical studies lead to a general observation: concertation is first and
foremost an opportunity to express dissatisfaction and frustration.
Everybody says that citizen participation represents democratic progress.
At the same time, nobody is fully satisfied with how it unveils. In fact, most
are more dissatisfied than they are satisfied. (2004, p.134).
One of the reasons for citizen dissatisfaction is the perception that
consultations rarely, if ever, impact on final decision-making. If we look again
WASTE MANAGEMENT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCINERATION 13
15 An associated argument here is that the government have effectively subverted EU guidelines
on waste as set out in the EU’s “waste hierarchy”. The waste hierarchy sets out the most favoured
options for waste management – beginning with prevention of waste, then reduction, recycling,
recovery (including incineration) and finally disposal. Critics of government policy point out that
current strategies are all geared towards least favoured options that do least to affect the amount
of waste that is being produced. They further argue that this is because concentrating on
prevention and reduction would be most unfavourable to the industrial sector as it would force
firms to internalise waste costs.
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at the CIG process, we can see this point being illustrated. From the outset,
the definition of terms such as “consultation” or “inclusion” differed greatly
between the understanding of DCC and community residents. DCC saw the
CIG process as giving “voice” to the community in a limited fashion. It was
meant only as a forum for raising concerns over incineration, not as a means
of challenging decisions already taken on the Poolbeg incinerator. According to
one DCC official – “The waste management plan was adopted in 1998…long
ago…long, long, long ago. The site was identified in 2000…long ago.
Happened. Done. Finished.” This official was very clear on the status of CIG
in relation to decision-making processes – “I think it’s nice to know what they
[CIG members] think but there’s nothing that their opinions can do to change
the waste management plan.”
One TD for the area made this observation on the CIG consultation
process:
…knowing what I know about the Ringsend/Poolbeg location, it’s very like
“we’ve decided to kill you, but we’ll have a consultation process as to the
method of execution”. And while there are some benefits to that, because
people, if they are going to be killed, would choose the least painful way, to
be flippant about it, they’re still going to be killed.
Critically, this respondent added:
…in one sense, it’s [CIG] a genuine improvement than what was the case
before. But set against the hierarchy of decision-making, it really is
affecting the quality of the decision on the margins rather than at central
level.
Given that the residents from the communities to be most affected by the
proposed incinerator have no recourse to elected representatives on this issue
and that the only way the governments policy can be challenged is through the
planning authorities, it is no surprise that some residents viewed this exercise
in “inclusion” as little more than an exercise in public relations by DCC. 
Contrary to Smith’s view (2003) that participation in deliberative
processes signifies “respect” and “impartiality”, outcomes can be divisive for
all involved. Again, Rui points out that concertation breeds suspicion
especially if citizens enter into these processes believing that they can affect
final decision-making:
Many analyses denounce the manipulation and instrumentalisation of
inhabitants, insisting on the insidious logic that gives citizens the illusion
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that their opinions that their opinions could be taken into account. This
suspicious attitude seeks to unmask the procedural illusion in order to
show that formal democracy is an obstacle to “real” democracy.” (2004, p.
135).
DCC would reject the “PR” accusation out of hand. According to one Dublin
City Council official who worked closely on the CIG, the objective was
“consultation”, but consultation within strictly defined parameters. When
asked directly whether CIG constituted “consultation” with the community,
she answered:
Right…from my own point of view, I would say yes…from their point of
view [the residents], they would probably say no. And the difference I
suppose is that in the terms of defining what is the scope of the
consultation…. The goal of the consultation in relation to the Community
Interest Groups was them looking at impacts and in that respect, it
certainly has been consultation.
For their part, residents would argue that conducting consultation at the
implementation phase of policy-making is largely a redundant exercise.
Inclusion, without the ability to influence decisions, does not, according to
some of the residents, constitute “proper” consultation. According to one
resident who described what she felt what “real” consultation should be:
You start at the beginning and they’re forgetting a blank page is the
beginning, it is proper consultation because you get everybody’s view. Now
the end product is not going to suit everybody and nobody expects it to, but
there has to be a compromise somewhere, but it has to start with a blank
page.
WHO DO STAKEHOLDERS REPRESENT?
Whether at EU level where a distinction is made between “recognised”
NGOs and local groups, or at national level, where specified groups are invited
to participate in consultation processes with the government, it is clear that
inequality of representation exists within civil society itself. Within the term
“community and voluntary sector” a myriad of organisations exist with their
own agendas and interests, and with vastly different capacities to access flows
of power and decision-making processes. The inclusion or exclusion of
organisations by institutions such as the EU invites accusations of co-option
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where only the “usual suspects” are included in partnership arrangements.
A look at the workings of the CIG in Ringsend is a case in point. One of the
more controversial issues emerging from this process related to the question
of whether the members of the CIG represented the wider community. This
became a critical point for CIG members. According to some of those that were
directly involved in this process, DCC deliberately attempted to portray
consultation with the CIG as consultation with the community. A CIG member
commented:
…on numerous occasions, I stated very clearly I wasn’t there representing
the community. I stated very clearly that I hadn’t got a mandate to
represent the community. But they constantly used the wording “on behalf
of your community”. And that really upset me because I made it very clear
to them…and even though I very loudly made it clear, I was still ignored.
CIG members were worried that if the CIG process were indeed perceived
as consultation with the wider communities of Ringsend and Sandymount,
then a certain degree of legitimacy would be bestowed on the process and its
outcomes. The CIG members went to great pains to point out in its final report
that the process did not constitute any kind of consultation with the wider
communities and that this requirement is yet to be fulfilled:
Each member has served on the CIG committee as an individual, and any
views expressed are individual views and opinions, and should not be
taken as indicative of the views of any wider group or association.
(Mercator Marketing Research, 2002, p. 11).
This brings us to a key issue in relation to the deployment of partnership-
as-governance. Interest groups or stakeholders, whether they are
transnational NGOs, the private sector or even community-based groups
obviously do not have to represent views of people other than their own
members and according to Casey and Gold (2000), “there is…a danger that
encompassing organisations become over-confident in their pursuit of what
they identify as a public good…” (p. 8). But can a system of governance that
relies primarily upon the views of interest groups ever be said to act in the
“public good”? Can they ever adequately represent views of non-members?
More importantly, can such a system acquire enough legitimacy with the
public in general, particularly on such a contentious and important public
issue as the introduction of incineration into Ireland?
While opposition to the proposed Poolbeg incinerator is still in its infancy,
from the very beginning, one transnational NGO – a recognised stakeholder
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both in EU and Irish consultation processes – became closely involved in a
protest against the incinerator. It became clear from the outset that the
transnational NGO had its own agenda to pursue through this local protest
campaign. According to a representative from this organisation, campaigns of
this sort followed a distinct pattern – the NGO would plan and run the
campaign, while the community itself would be excluded from any strategic
decisions. Despite this exclusion – and the lack of any mandate, this
organisation saw itself as acting on behalf of the residents on the incinerator
issue.
It was evident from an early stage that the aims of this organisation and
the aims of the residents of Ringsend diverged somewhat. One of the central
themes that the transnational NGO was keen to promote was to conceptualise
incineration as a global issue – an actualisation of the “thinking globally,
acting locally” paradigm. Some residents saw this as an “agenda” that was
being promoted by the NGO – over the interests of the community – and voiced
their concerns. One NGO representative comments: 
Well…Personally I had a lot of opposition one evening from a member of the
Ringsend community. What I tried to do was put forward the view there is
global issues involved in this. Just because this horrible machine ends up
in one community is where all the sourcing is coming from…i.e. where all
the waste is coming from and that it wasn’t necessarily about communities
themselves. The whole picture has to start at community and work its way
out and….I was told that I had an agenda….I was flawed and that I
shouldn’t be talking about that and that it was only about the incinerator
there.
This particular dispute was resolved primarily because the NGO has had
a major rethink on its strategy in relation to involvement with community-
based protest campaigns. The new position it takes to act merely as a resource
of expert knowledge, to be accessed if and when members of the community
request it.
CONCLUSION
One accusation generally levelled at national partnership agreements is
that they are effectively a means of co-opting potential opposition to policy. If
this is the case, then it is a ploy that has resolutely failed in relation to the
Poolbeg incinerator. The institutional deficiencies identified here, means, as
Rui contends, that concertation enhances dissatisfaction amongst citizens.   
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The case that I have looked at here breaks one of the key rules of social
partnership and concertation – namely that these arrangements are meant to
complement and not replace representative democratic processes, particularly
so if the “institutional thickness” does not exist in order to successfully
manage issues of conflict and decision-making. The consequence of the 2001
Amendment to the 1996 Waste Management Act was that any subsequent
governance arrangement would struggle to generate any substantial
legitimacy amongst citizens. Removing decision-making powers from elected
representatives adds an extra burden to concertation arrangements and only
breed’s dissatisfaction, frustration and suspicion. 
Added to this are issues of inequality amongst partners, exclusion in final
decision-making for residents elected representatives and certain
stakeholders, as well as a lack of adequate representation through the
stakeholder system. Taken together, I would argue that partnership-as-
governance in this instance is only likely to enhance the possibility of a
community-based protest emerging during the course of statutory process,
rather than creating any durable consensus between citizens, the government
and other interested stakeholders. 
The main issue here however, is that the institutional arrangements of
partnership-as-governance – as it has been exercised in this case – manifestly
fails to engage with issues of power. Without recognition of the assymetrical
way in which decision-making power is distributed, terms such as “public
consultation”, “participation” or “social inclusion” remain largely hollow when
it comes to governance. If partnership-as-governance is to become viable –
either as an appendage to existing governance processes or as a
reconfiguration of governance itself, then a number of issues need to be
examined by all concerned. These include addressing the inequality between
stakeholders through capacity building measures, exploring and identifying
the parameters by which representation through stakeholders is acceptable,
and lastly, a clearer definition of anticipated outcomes from concertation
processes – particularly whether or not it means inclusion in final decision-
making – so as to avoid charges of deception. 
DCC states that “…participatory democracy and active citizenship at local
level calls for a devolution of power to the extent that the decisions made
genuinely reflect the views of those communities most likely to be affected by
them”.16 I would argue that such an arrangement is not feasible if issues of
inequality between partners, representation through stakeholders and
inclusion in final decision-making are not adequately addressed.
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